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NoTEs AND Com Nnrs
RIGHTS OF A CREDITOR OF A SETTLOR TO REACH THE CORPUS
OF A REVOCABLE TRUST
The purpose of this note is to examine the substantive rights of a creditor to
reach the corpus of a trust when the settlor expressly reserves to himself in the
trust instrument the power to revoke the trust settlement.
In analyzing this problem, an actual case will help to well-illustrate the
situation involved. In Hill v. Cornwall & Bro. s Assignee,' an early Kentucky case,
a father made a trust conveyance of real property for the benefit of Is daughter
at a time when he was in prosperous circumstances. The father retained full
power to revoke each or any of the trust provisions. Some fifteen years thereafter,
the father became indebted and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
In attempting to reach the trust corpus, the assignee, representing the creditors,
contended that the power of revocation reserved by the father in the trust instru-
ment destroyed the conveyance and left the settlor, so far as creditors were con-
cemed, as if no conveyance had been made. The Court in refusing to sustain
this contention stated in effect that the title passed from the settlor at the date
of the conveyance and if the transfer was not made for a fraudulent purpose the
reservation of a power to revoke would not invalidate the trust even as to creditors.
In absence of statute, this undoubtedly represents the great weight of authority.!
If the settlor revokes the trust and recovers the trust property, the creditors,
obviously, can reach the property; but they cannot compel the settlor to exercise
his power to revoke the trust for their benefit.'
This precise problem seems not to have arisen at common law,' however, in
modem cases one or more of several explanations are usually given to substantiate
the general rule that a power of revocation reserved by a settlor is of no benefit
to his creditor in attempting to reach the corpus of the trust. In Jones v. Clifton,'
it was stated that a power to revoke is not an interest in the property which could
be transferred to another, or sold on execution, or devised by will or is not to be
considered a chose in action. In other cases it has been emphasized that the
power to revoke does not invalidate the trust because the title passes from the
settlor to the trustee at the time of the conveyance;6 or until the power is exercised
the interest remains vested as though no such power had been reserved;7 or the
power to revoke, unexercised, is a "dead thing."8 Whatever the reason, it is quite
195 Ky. 512, 26 S.W 540 (1894).
1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES sec. 96 (7th ed. 1929); 3 ScoTT oN
TRusTs sec. 330.12 (1939); See Note, 92 A.L.R. 282 (1934) for collection of
cases and annotations.
'RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS see. 330 (0) (1935).
'Retaining a power to revoke a voluntary settlement was strongly favored at
common law, and if a settlor did not reserve such a power it was open to sus-
picion of an undue advantage being taken of him. Also at common law, if a
person had a power of appointment it was held that Is creditors could not reach
the property if the power was not exercised, even though the power was a general
power of appointment. If, however, the donee of a general power exercised:it by
appointing to others than Is creditors, the creditors might reach the property.
5101 U. S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 908 (1880).
'Gall v. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 1000, 150 S.W 2d -757
(1942); Hill v. Cornwell & Bro. Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S.W 540 (1894). -
'National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N.J. Eq. 74, 128 A
586 (1925).
'In re Dolans Estate, 279 Pa. 589, 124 A. 176 (1924).
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clear that the settlor s power to revoke does not constitute an asset or have such
other legal significance as will entitle a creditor to subject it to his claim.
Thus, the creditor normally is forced to attack the conveyance on a collateral
ground. He may seek relief on the basis of a fraudulent conveyance contending
that the power to revoke retained the instrument is an indication of fraud and
this, together with other factors, is sufficient to put the transfer in the category
of one hindenng, delaying or defrauding creditors.'
Relief also may be sought on the theory that the trust settlement is "illusory"
or "testamentary.""0 Many times where a settlor reserves to himself a power to
revoke the trust, he will also reserve other powers, such as the right to manage
the property, to appoint heneficianes by will, to receive an income for life from
the trust res, to dispose of the res either in whole or in part, or to direct the trustees
in admimstenng the trust. If the creditor can prove that the purported convey-
ance was in fact testamentary and fails to comply with the Statute of Wills, or
that there was only a colorable transfer of the property, then he may treat the
property as that of the settlor s."
In a few states the difficulty of reaching the trust res by the creditor when
the settlor merely reserves a power to revoke the trust has been completely
remedied by statute." Ohio offers a very good example. The statute there states:
1. the creator of a trust may reserve to himself any use of power,
beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant to another, in-
cluding the power to alter, amend or revoke such trust, and such trust
shall be valid as to all persons, except that any beneficial interest
reserved to such creator shall be subject to be reached by the credi-
tors of such creator, and except that where the creator of such trust
reserves to himself for his own benefit a power of revocation, a court
of equity, at the suit of any creditor or creditors of the creator, may
compel the exercise of such power of revocation so reserved, to the
same extent and under the same conditions that such creator could
have exercised the same." 13
Under a similar statute the Alabama Court has asserted that if a settlor reserves
to himself a power to revoke in any conveyance, he is deemed, so far as creditors
are concerned, as the absolute owner of the estate so conveyed."4
As a practical matter the relief open to the creditor through collateral attack
is so meager as to be of little value. Attacking the trust conveyance as being in
fraud of creditors too often puts upon the creditor an insurmountable hardship
because it may be extremely difficult for him to sustain the burden of proof that
the conveyance was made for a fraudulent purpose.' Then, too, the conveyance
may have been executed at a time when any fraud on the part of the settlor
9 cf. Stephens v. Detroit Trust Co., 284 Mich. 149, 278 N.W 799 (1938).
No differentiation is made for the purpose of this note between an "illusory"
or "testamentary" trust.
"Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (1943).
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, sec. 75 (1940); II IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 56-610
(Burns, 1933); N. Y. REAL Pnop. LAW sec. 145 (Thompson, 1939); 6 Omo GEN-.
CODE Ai. sec. 8617 (1938). The Indiana and N. Y. statutes apply only to
realty.
" 6 Omo GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 8617 (1938).
'Blackwell v. Harbin, 186 Ala. 531, 65 So. 35 (1914).
' Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ouo St. 328, 21 N.E. 2d 119 (1939).
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would be precluded, such as in the Hill case" where the settlor was in very pros-
perous circumstances at the time the trust was executed.
Similarly, the creditor who seeks to set aside the transfer in trust as being
"illusory" or "testamentary" is faced with considerable practical difficulty. As
pointed out in the Restatement of Trusts, the settlor of a trust may reserve to
himself any power wich he desires with respect to the property, so long as the
power so reserved is not illegal. However, the settlor in so doing may effect
such a retention of control over the trust that it results in a testamentary dis-
position and must conform to the Statute of Wills.' No definite line of demarca-
tion may be drawn from the cases as to the .amount of dominon the settlor may
retain in the trust so as to render it "illusory" or "testamentary." Of course, the
creditors may reach those benefits so reserved,' such as income from the rents
and profits or an income from the trust res, however, this may be insufficient to
satisfy his claim. Further, if the settlor purports to create a trust for others but
reserves possession, income, and principal to himself for life, with a power to
revoke, in addition to the power of control and management, ins position differs
in no substantial way from a general owner, and the so-called cestuis interest is
too nebulous and shadowy to be recognized as an equitable interest." The plac-
ing of a colorable legal title in the trustee with the settlor retaining the power to
revoke, control, and management over the property may result in a simple agency
relation instead of a true trust.n Suffice it to say that in dealing with these re-
served powers of the settlor, the courts have been extremely liberal in giving
validity to the purported trust settlement as an inter vivos transfer,' and as a prac-
tical consequence it may be virtually impossible for a creditor to attack success-
fully a conveyance in trust from this standpoint.
If we assume that the payment of just debts demands respect both from a
moral and legal viewpoint and that every aid, short of debtor oppression, should
be given the creditor in the collection of is just claims, it seems unsound to allow
the debtor to defeat the creditors rights by disposing of the property yet reserving
in himself the power of revocation. If the law allows the settlor the power to
revoke the trust and perhaps to enjoy the benefits of the conveyed property at the
same time, it seems logical that the power should be treated as an intangible asset
which may be reached by creditors and exercised by them in the satisfaction of
their claims. The very fact that the settlor reserves such a power is indicative
that he does not wish to release his dominion over the trust.
The reservation of such powers in a conveyance with the vesting of legal
title in the trustee and the beneficial interest in the cestut que trust seems to result
from the historical development of technical principles of trust and property law
rather than any regard for a sound policy to protect creditor s rights. Admittedly,
the creditor may be criticized for extending credit without other adequate security,
1 Hill v. Cornwall & Bros. Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S.W 540 (1894).
'
T RESTATEMENT, TTusTs sec. 37 (1935).
"Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 138, 67 A. 52, 53 (1907).
1 I BOCERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs see. 104 (1935); Goodrich v. City Nat.
Bank, 270 Mich. 222, 258 N.W 253 (1935).
"Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E. 2d 627 (1938).
I BOrERT, TRuSTs AND TRUSTEES sec. 104 (1935). For extreme cases where
trusts have been upheld see Kelly v. Parker, 181 IMI. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899);
Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W 2d 458 (1942); Cleveland Trust Co. v.
White, supra.
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but should tis prejudice the creditor once he seeks to realize on what may be
considered an asset? Even though the creditor did or did not have notice that
the debtor had made such a conveyance with the power to revoke, once the power
is recognized as an asset of the debtor it should properly be subjected to satisfy
his indebtedness. The intervention of creditors of the settlor in such an arrange-
ment impairs the traditional rights or relationship existing between the settlor,
trustee and beneficiary only to the extent that the beneficiary s interest may now
be defeated not only by the wish of the settlor but by creditors of the settlor if
sii 'jecting the proceeds of the trust is necessary to the satisfaction of their claims.
This does not constitute a serious encroachment upon the cestui's interest since
that interest was always held by him subject to a power of later being revoked.
However, it is to be noted that the trust, revocable as it is, remains valid as to
all other persons.'
It is interesting to note that this is essentially the status of the power to
revoke in other fields of the law. In Jones v. Clifton,= for instance, a trustee in
bankruptcy was seeking to reach the res of a trust where the bankrupt settlor had
reserved a power of revocation. In refusing to allow the trustee to exercise such
power the Court stated that the power to revoke was not such an interest in prop-
erty which could be transferred or vested in another so as to be executed. How-
ever, since this decision the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted which provided
that any powers which may have been exercised for the debtor s own benefit vest
in the trustee.' Thus, it would appear that a power to revoke would pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy so as to allow the trust corpus to be applied in satisfaction
of the creditors claims.' Also in the field of taxation the courts regard a power
of revocation as something more than just a mere power that may later be exer-
cised so as to defeat the conveyance. In Burnet, Commzsstoner of Internal Revenue,
v. Guggenheim,-' there was an attempt to levy a gift tax on the donor of a gratui-
tous trust settlement where the settlor had reserved a power to revoke the trust
in whole or in part. The Court, in refusing to uphold the tax, stated that the
settlor did not succeed in divesting himself of title by transferring it to others,
b;ut the "substance of his dominion was the same. In still another case - the First
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that whenever a settlor of a trust has retained the
unfettered power to make such a fundamental alteration as change of beneficanes,
the corpus of the trust is includable at. death in his gross estate.2
In conclusion it may be said that the policy of the courts in failing to recog-
nize the power to revoke a trust conveyance as an asset of the settlor has become
to firmly embedded in our jurisprudence as to lend itself primarily to legislative
' The Ohio Statute, note 14 supra, expressly states that the reservation of
such powers is valid to all persons except creditors of the creator.
' See note 6 supra.
Sec. 70 a(3), 11 U.S.C.A. see. 110.
14 COLLMR, BAMaMUrPTcY 992 (14th ed. 1942); REsTATE mNT, TnusTs sec.
330 (o) (1935).
n288 U. S. 280, 77 L. Ed. 748 (1932).
Chnckernng v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 118 F 2d 254 (1941).
See.2 BOCERT, TnusTs AND TnusTEEs sec. 278 (1935).
'Note in tlus case the settlor was only entitled to a change of beneficiaries
and not a general power of revocation.
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action. By adopting statutes similar to those in the states furmsnhing such statu-
tory remedy a gap in the law will be closed. As was very aptly put by a New
York Court,
As to my creditors property is mnne that becomes mine for the
asking, and no words can make an instrument strong enough to hold
it for me, and to 'keep it from them."
FrD CHARLEs
'UIlman v. Cameron, 186 N. Y. 339, 346, 78 N.E. 1074, 1076 (1906).

